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Recent research on four-year-olds' and five-year-olds' knowledge of 
quantification has made two strongly attested and somewhat unexpected 
observations. First, it appears there is a stage in the emergence of universal 
quantification when the child fails to make consistent use of a syntactic 
mechanism---such as May's ( 1977, 1985) 'Quantifier Raising' (QR). or Heim's 
(1982) 'NP-prefixing'---toderive a restriction on the domain of quantification. 
This stage occurs well after the child has firmly grasped that universal 
quantifiers assert the completeness or exhaustive denumerability of some 
contextually relevant set. The second observation is that children at this stage 
have a strong, non-adult-like tendency to insist on distributive readings, not 
only with universal quantifiers (Drozd and Philip. 1992) hut also with plural 
pronouns (Crain and Miyamoto, 1991: :vtiyamoto, 1992). Hearing the word 
every or how many can trigger such a 'fixation' on the distributive reading that 
the child consistently rejects collective and cumulative readings readily 
available to the adult. This latter observation is all the more surprising given 
the crosslinguistic evidence of the preference in adult grammars for 
cumulative readings (Gil. 1982). 
In this paper I will argue that these two seemingly unrelated 
phenomena derive from the same underlying cause, namely (i) that the child 
prefers to quantify over events rather than objects (Philip and Aurelio. 1991: 
Philip and Takahashi. 1991: Takahashi, 1991). and (ii) that the child derives 
a restriction for the domain of quantification by means of a non-syntactic. 
pragmatic mechanism (cf. Philip, 1991a, 1991b, to appear) that may be loosely 
characterized as a form of 'accommodation· in the sense of Lewis ( 1979). 
The first claim---which I will call the EVENT ()UANllflCAl IONA!. 
HYPOTHESIS---is based on the assumption that quantification over events or 
situations is a fundamental semantic capability (cf. Davidson, 1966: 
Higginbotham. I 983: 8arwise and Perry. 1983: Kratzer. 1989: Parsons. 
1990). 1 The supposition is that children (and adults under certain 
conditions) resort to quantifying over events in their interpretation of 
universal quantifiers because it achieves a net reduction of the total 
processing load. In other terms, it provides an alternative to type-shifting---a 
presumably costly operation (cf. Partee and Rooth, 1983 ). 
1 In this paper I will not distinguish between 'situations' in the sense of Barwise and Perry 
(1983) and 'events· in the sense of, say, lligginbotham (1983). 
1l1e second claim is that in the absence of QR (or like mechanism) the 
restriction to the domain of quantification is derived in a very non-adult-like 
but nonetheless rule-governed manner. TI1e rule in question---which I will 
call the RESTRICl'OR RULE---may be seen to instantiate the Subset Principle 
(e.g. Berwick, 1985). According to this general law of language acquisition, 
the child initially acquires a new rule of grammar in the most restrictive of its 
available forms, and thereby adopts an option that generates a subset of the 
adult grammar. In this manner (arguably only in this manner) subsequently 
assimilated positive evidence is able to modify the initial posit. Given 
quantification over events, then, the Restrictor Rule is seen to provide the 
most restrictive form of universal quantification because it supplies the largest 
possible linguistically? determined restriction of the domain of quantification, 
which increases the quantified sentence's falsifiability by positive evidence. 
The paper is organized as follows. First I will present a phenomenon 
well-attested in children's use of universal quantifiers---which I call the 
SYMMETRICAL INTERPRETATION---that strongly argues against the view that 
QR is well-established in the grammars of young children, even as late as five 
years of age. Space limitation prevent a detailed discussion of why arguments 
in the literature to the contrary are not compelling; however, briefly put, the 
problem is that the evidence cited either fails to demonstrate that Move a is 
the operant principle behind the observed phenomenon (Lee, 1986; Chien and 
Wexler, 1989), or it is not very firmly established (Miyamoto, 1992). Having 
examined basic properties of the symmetrical interpretation that highlight its 
nonsyntactic nature, I will next present evidence that it is nonetheless a truly 
linguistic phenomenon, not an effect of some meta-linguistic. general 
cognitive mechanism. TI1en. I will give my account of it. Finally, I will show 
how my account predicts children's observed preference for a distributive 
reading with universal quantifiers. 
The symmetrical interpretation: nonsyntactic aspects 
Evidence of the non-compositional way in which young children derive 
a restriction on the domain of quantification can easily be overlooked since 
the truth conditions of the symmetrical interpretation differ only mmimally 
from those of an adult interpretation of universal quantification. The 
difference is revealed, however. by showing a child a picture such as in (1.a) 
and asking whether every boy is riding a pony. 111e typical response 
2 As opposed lo non.linguistic restriction nf this domain in terms of a relevant 'context 
set' (Stalnaker, 1978) or 'presupposition set' ( Rooth, 1985). Children master this more basic 
sort of restriction of the domain of quantification long before they face the problem of 
interpreting universal quantifiers (see also footnn1e 8). 
- ~_)..,.(l 
(approximately 75%· of the time) is no for this experimental condition, with 
reference made to the riderless pony (not to the mom) as the reason for the 
negative response. The same child. however. will give adult-like responses to 
the questions in the control conditions exemplified in (lb )-(1.d). 
(1) a.transitive b.control 1 
---ls every bov nding ---Is e\.'C,Y boy holding 
a pony? an umbrella? 
---No, not that one! ---No, one has a balloon 
c.control 2 d.control 3 
c}j @] 11 ~ ~ ~ Q~ 
---ls evety elephant ---Is eve1y pig eating 
holding a flag? an apple? 
---Yea ---Yea 
-- -
Restricting our ,lftention 10 the non-adult-like response in (1.a)---and 
abstracting away from interrogative mood---. the meaning the child gives to 
the adult's question may be provisionally described by the logical 
representation in (2). which happens also to fit as a description of an 
available adult meaning of The bovs are riding the ponit'S (Langendoen, I 978). 
It may also be likened to the 'complete group' interpretation of Kempson and 
Cormack (1981 ), and the ·strong S)mmetric' interpretation of Gil ( 1982). 
( ,z) ( (v'xEboy')(3yEpony')[ride '(x,y) J & (v'yEpony')(3xEboy')[ ride'< x,y)I) 
Aside from a formidable mapping problem, this 'Sum of Plurals' 
interpretation (cf. Chien and Wexler. 1989) fails to achieve descriptive 
adequacy in that it incorrectly predicts a negative response for control 
condition 3 in (1.d). Keeping this in mmd. it is nonetheless useful as a first 
pass representati0n of the meaning the child is entertaining. 
·n1e symmetrical interpretation phenomenon is well known in the 
psychological literature ( for overviews see Macnamara. 1982, 1986 and Braine 
and Rumian. 1983). Since its discovery by Inhelder and Piaget (1964), with 
French /011.1, evidence of it has been documented with English all and each 
(Donaldson and l\.kGarrigle, 197.3: Donaldson and Lloyd. 1974: Buc\'i, 1978) 
and with everv (Philip and Aurelio, 1991; Philip and Takahashi, 1991: 
Takahashi, 199L Philip, 1991a. !99lb. to appear), with Chinese nn·1 (Chien 
and Wexler. 1989) and with Japanese dono-mo and minna (Takahashi, 1991; 
Kobuchi and Philip, 1990). In a recent set of comparable studies on every', 
involving a total of 129 four-year-olds. the svmmetrical interpretation was 
detected on average 74% of the time for the experimental condition 
represented in (ia}--hrnceforth. the transitii·c com!itim1---as shown in (3). 
( )3. 
stu<!y__ I n 
ltlPiM
al!e 
( 
Philip and Aurelio I 991 20 4-3 
Philip and Takahashi 199 9 4-6 
Philip (to appear) 4 l 4-9 
Philin 1991b 59 4-6 
129 4-6 
mc1dence o 
svmmetric:al interpretation 
84% I 
80'!; I 
70% I73'k 
74% 
The symmetrical interpretation proves to be fairly insensitive to 
syntactic structure. for :in experimental condition formally comparable to the 
transitive condition in (la) Donaldson and Lloyd ( 1974) found no significant 
effect on the phenomenon when they moved quantifiers all and each to 
floated positions. This finding was replicated in Drozd and Philip (1992), 
where in a study of 18 four-year-olds (mean age 4-9) the symmetrical 
interpretation was observed 64% of the time for the transitive condition with 
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sentences such as The bo1•s are all ridinf a pony as against a virtually identical 
67% of the time with Every boy is riding a ponv.3 Further evidence of the 
insignificance of syntax comes from the observation that placing the quantifier 
in object position ( e.g. ls a boy IS riding e1·e,y horse?) has no significant effect 
on the phenomenon (Philip ::ind Aurelio, 1991: Philip and Takahashi, 1991).4 
Nor doe5 putting the indefinite NP in an embedded context ( e.g. ls i.:1:erv boy 
who's riding a ponv waving?) appear to have any effect (Philip and Aurelio, 
1991 ). Finally, contra the earlier finding of Philip ( I991 a), we may observe 
that argument structure does not appear to interact with the phenomenon. 
Thus. for example, the pictures in ( If.a) elicits the same degree of symmetrical 
interpretation with Is every mom showing a hoy a duck? as does ls every mom 
showing a duck to a boy?, and likewise for the picture in (lf.b) with respect to 
the sentences ls every dud giving a girl a ruhbil? and J:, eve,y dad giving a rabbit 
fO a girl? (Philip, 1991b). 
('t) a.extra object b.extra recipient 
Linguistic aspects of the phenomenon 
Given the seemingly non-syntactic nature of symmetrical interpretation 
it is not surprising that it has often been discounted as meta-linguistic 
phenomenon arising from an innate (Gestaltian) preference for symmetry 
(lnhelder and Piaget, 1964: Revlis and Leircr, 1980), or. in contemporary 
3 '!be same study found no significant difference with respect to incidence of symmetrical 
interpretation between all and every across a variety of conditions. 
4 The picture used for this condition showed five boys: three riding one pony each, two 
more just watching. 
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terms, 'cognitive isomorphism' (Roeper and de Villiers, 1991). The first 
theory of the phenomenon considered it symptomatic of the child being in an 
early stage in the development of logical competence. According to Inhelder 
and Piaget ( 1964), during the stage of the 'non-graphic collection' children 
cannot distinguish between the logical relations of class membership and 
sublogical, part-whole relations, and consequently 'all they can do to decide 
whether all the X's are y is to ascertain whether or not the collection of X's 
coincides with that of Y's...'(p.65). Formalizing this hypothesis in terms of set 
subtraction, we can see how it successfully accounts for cases of symmetrical 
interpretation with sentences like Are all the circles blue? when asked of the 
picture in (5'.a). If the child is entertaining for this sentence a logical 
representation roughly of the form in (S.b), then he or she will answer no 
because of the presence of the blue squares; {ylyEblue'} - {xlxEcircle'} is 
not null. This accords with Inhelder and Piaget's ( 1964) observations. Their 
account, however, cannot be extended to the cases of symmetrical 
interpretation found with the transitive condition of (1.a). Under Inhelder & 
Piaget's ( 1964) account, the child's logical representation of Is every bov riding 
a pony? would be as roughly portrayed in (5.c). But this falsely predicts a yes 
response since it is the case that {y lyEride" pony'} · {x lxEboy'} = A. 
(5} a.lnhelder and Piaget's (1964) experimental condition 
---No, there are squares and circles (i.e. some squares are blue too) 
b.({xlxEcircle'} {ylyEblue'} = A) & ({yiyEblue'} · {xlxEcircle'} = A) 
c.( {x lxEboy'} - {ylyEride "pony'} A)  
& ({yiyEride"pony'} · {xjxEboy'} = A)  
A second major psychological account of symmetrical interpretation 
comes from the literature on the adult processing of syllogisms. Under 
certain (fatigue-inducing) conditions adults can be found to produce an 
interpretation of universal quantifiers strikingly similar to that of the four-
year-olds. To acrnunt for this Revlis (1975) and Revlin and Leirer (1978, 
1980) have proposed the 'conversion model'. according to which an original 
input linguistic representation of the fom1 [all A are BJ is transformed into 
a 'converted' output representation of the form [all Bare AJ, where A is the 
subject NP and Bis a predicate nominal. Both the original and the converted 
representation are stored in memory but since the memory stack operates on 
a first-in-last-out basis the converted representation always has priority. TI1is 
proposal successfully accounts for the S)tnmetrical interpretation observed 
under Inhelder and Piaget's ( 1964) experimental condition exemplified in 
(5.a), since it would not be the case that all the blue ones(?) are circles (A). 
However. again. the logical extension of this proposaf to account for 
instances of symmetrical interpretation under the transitive condition 
exemplified in (1 .a) falsely predicts a yes response: it is true of the picture in 
(1.a) that all the pony-riders are boys. 
Despite the difficulties of these particular psychological theories one 
might still maintain. vaguelv. that the phenomenon is due to a general. non-
linguistic preference for symmetry. There are basic empirical problems with 
this general hypothesis. however. First, studies of children's perception of 
symmetry show that it is not until five or six years of age that (vertical) 
symmetry has a significant facilitating effect on pattern recall (Boswell. 1976). 
This is well after the onset of the symmetrical interpretation phenomenon, 
which may occur as early as 3 years of age---simultaneous. it appears, with 
acquisition of the basic meanings of i.Tl'f\' and each. Secondly, under the 
assumption that the phenomenon is purely cognitive in nature we would 
expect perceptual encoding alone toe-licit it just as readily as linguistic input 
containing a universal quantifier. But this is a false prediction. When the 
linguistic input is a transitive predicate and a universally quantified subject the 
picture in (6) elicits the characteristic symmetrical interpretation response 
(e.g. No, it takes a dog 10 dance and that boat doesn't have any). This is the 
typical response for the transitive condition. For the same picture, however. 
there is a dramatic inhibition of the phenomenon with alternative linguistic 
input. as shown in the tables in (1). The contrast Ill the incidence of non-
adult-like responses between the transitive condition on the one hand and the 
INTRANSITIVE and JN('()RPORATED conditions on the other is highly 
significant. 6 
5 Since under standard assumptions 1\P and VP are of the same logical type, namely 
<e,t>. 
6 The fact that there is any symmelrkal interpretation at all with the intransitive, bare 
plural and incnrpC1ratcd c,rnJitions i, due partiallv to a perceptual set effect (cf. :vkhlcr and 
Carey. 1976), partially to the fact th:it for younger children the phenomenon is not inhibited 
under these conditions. 
-----------
---
-- -
<g ' ~~ 
--~-~'n 
' LS "1 
I ,. j________ 
(?-) a.Philip (l99lb): n = 59: mean age 4-6 
transitive 
---ls everv dog ridin,1; a boat? 
---No 
intransitive 
---ls ei-crv doR dancing? 
---Yea 
bare plural 
---Are dogs riding boats? 
---Yea 
incorporated 
---h evav dog a bo<11-rider' 
---Yea 
transiJjye intransitive bare Jura 
73% 11% 34r;;:; {s.e, SC1) 
(transitive vs intransitive;11are plural: p 0.000) 
b.Drozd and Philip ( 1992): n 18: mean age 4-9 
,_~t~ra=1=1s~i=ti~v~e-+--=inrorporated  
670/r 44% (p = 0.0093)  
The facts in (7) show that symmetrical interpretation is not 
independent of linguistic content or form. The input sentence must contain 
a universal quantifier (cf. bare plural condition) and it must also contain one 
or more unincorporated indefinite NPs. This suggests that the mechanism 
producing the s;mmetrical interpretation is not meta-linguistic. Assuming 
Fodor's ( 1983) 'Modularity Thesis', the mechanism in question would seem 
to belong to a semantic1pragmatic subcomponent of the language faculty 
where syntactic structure is only minimally represented. 
The proposal 
As an introduction to the event quantificational account of the 
symmetrical interpretation that I will argue for, it is worthwhile considering 
first the intractability of the phenomenon within the framework of 
quan t1fication over obJccts. Consider first a simple Montogovian hypothesis 
that what the children (and tired auults) are doing is substituting a 
biconditional for a conditional in their interpretation of the universal 
quantifier. as shown in (/{.a). abstracting awav from intensionality. This 
overcomes the mapping problem of the representation in (ll.) but, again, like 
the psvchological accounts discussed above, it fails to explain the basic 
phenomenon as observed under the transitive condition. It is the case that 
every pony-rider is a boy. 
(8) a.,\P~0 Vx ~P(x) <---> O(x)] 
b. 
Vx,y~-boy'(x) ponv'(y) S 
/"··",-.
x rides y 
C. 
A second conceivable approach is to try to adopt a form of unse]ective 
binding (Lewis, 1975: Heim, 1982) to account for the phenomenon, as shown 
in (8.b). This works for the transitive condition: however, it makes the 
(absurdly) false 7 prediction that children will reject the picture in (S'.c) for 
the sentence Eierv hov is ridlnr; a ponv. !\'or can things be patcheu up very 
ea~ilv by quantifying over n-tuples of entities instead of indi\·idual entities, as, 
for instance, in May's ( 1989) analysis of 'resumptive quantification·. This 
would simply return us to the problem of falsely predicting a yes response 
Allested by virtually every studv in the literature on childrcns' use ot universal 
quantifiers. 
under the transitive condition. The lone pony running loose in (1.a) does not 
obviously constitute, without some additional (crucial) stipulation, one of a set 
of related entities. 
Bearing these problems in mind, let us now consider the account of 
symmetrical interpretation I am proposing. It consists of three parts. First 
is the Event Quantificational Hypothesis, which claims that young children 
prefer to interpret universal quantification as quantification over events, at 
least in the case of concrete events. Here it is assumed that truth is evaluated 
with respect to a mental model derived by perceptual mechanisms ( cf. 
Johnson-Laird, 1983) which may represent not only objects but also events, 
i.e. sets of related objects. That is, thanks to a very basic, 
cognitive principle, a set of objects perceived as related in some manner, 
whether in terms of physical proximity, cause and effect, or some other basic 
relation, may also be apprehended as a whole, as constituting a particular 
event or situation. In addition. a single object standing alone may be 
perceived as constituting an event ('event' subsumes both action and state). 
I will assume further that any given event may receive an algebraic analysis 
in terms of the objects that participate in it. Thus, for example, if an event 
e1 of type a consists of three objects a, b and c, then it will also have six 
associated subevents, each one also of type a, as shown in ( 'f ). Solid lines 
in ('f} indicate part-whole relations; circles define sets of objects that 
constitute events. 
("1) 
Note that the event associated with the object token a, i.e. e4, cannot 
be summed with, say, event e2 to yield an event consisting of the participants 
a, b, and c. This is because there is no perceived relation between object a 
and objects b or d. 
Assuming this psychological model, then, the Event Quantificational 
Hypothesis is the claim that children make use of the innate ability to 
perceive events to simplify an exhaustive denumeration procedure that is 
activated by universal quantification. The simplification may consist in part 
in having less entities to individuate perceptually for the purposes of this 
denumeration procedure. As already noted, the strategy/option of shifting to 
event quantification with universal quantifiers is not unique to children; 
adults too exhibit the symmetrical interpretation. Furthermore, the unmarked 
interpretation of adult adverbs of quantification seem to call for event 
quantification (Berman, 1987; de Swart, 1990). 
The second part of the proposal is the syntactic claim that children at 
this age impose a tripartite structure (cf. Heim, 1982; Partee, 1990, 1991) as 
the logical form they ascribe to a sentence containing a universal quantifier. 
Ignoring S-structure position, as if matching a template of canonical form, the 
child obligatorily interprets the quantifier as if it occupied a sentence-initial, 
adverb-like position (cf. Roeper and de Villiers, 1991 ), as exemplified in (10) 
with respect to the sentence Every boy is riding a pony. 
(10) A'7 
V, R(•) /  
3x,y s  
boy(x)  
pony(y) L 
x is riding(e) y 
Whether the child actually derives an LF fitting this description by 
means of an application of Move a is not clear. Such an analysis is no doubt 
compatible with my proposal. The point, though, is that even if there actually 
is quantifier fronting by a computational mechanism of the syntactic 
component, it would not be an instance of QR since, crucially, the NP in 
construction with the quantifier at S-structure is 'left behind'. Consequently, 
the restrictor, R, in (1Q), is not defined in the syntactic component. 
In so far as there is a kind of primordial, 'anti-compositional' QR at 
work in the derivation of the logical form in ( 10) it would seem to be driven 
not by syntactic principle but rather by an interpretive need. In order for a 
quantifier to be interpreted it must be 'removed' from its sentential context. 
Having done this, though, a new interpretive problem arises: how to 
determine the restriction on the domain of quantification. The third part of 
my proposal, then, is that the content of R in ( 10) is supplied by a pragmatic 
Restrictor Rule that generates as the domain of quantification the set of all 
maximal events, or maximal subevents of potential events, of the type denoted 
by the nuclear scope S, as shown in (11). 
(11) 
[R] = [e I 3e'[RELEVANT(e') & [S](e') & (e ~ e')] & MAX(e~ 
where: 
RELEVANT = contextually relevant. i.e. in the field of attention 
(defined by a picture), whether actually or potentially visible 
MAX = maximal event that is actually visible (in a picture), U-
i.e. {e I 3e' [actually~visible'(e') & (e ~ e') ---> (e = e')JJ 
ITS] = fe I 3x.y [boy'(x) & pony'(y) & ride'(x.y,e)J} 
As a result of restricting the domain of quantification in this manner. 
the child is compelled to judge the sentence E1·crv hov is riding a ponv false 
with respect to the picture in /1.a) because there will be included in the 
domain of quantification one sub-event of a boy-riding-pony event in which 
it is not the case that a boy is riding a pony. as shown in the mental model in 
(1'2.), where [R] = {e 1,e 2.e_,.e4 } 
(12) 
The falsifying case is event e4, which has ended up in the restricted 
domain of the quantifier because it is a maximal subevent of a potential 
instance of the type of event described by the nuclear scope, but which is 
falsifying because it does not in fact satisfy the truth conditions stipulated by 
the nuclear scope. 
Having examined the basic manifestation of the phenomenon. i.e. the 
non-adult-like negative response of the transitive condition. we must next see 
how the analysis also explains its apparent disappearance under the 
intransitive and the incorporated conditions discussed in (6) and Cn In the 
case of the intransitive condition, the inhibition effect is only apparent. The 
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child may still be quantifying over events, but in this case the logical 
representation he or she entertains happens to be functionally equivalent to 
that of an adult quantifying over objects, as shown in (1.3). Hence the 
appearance of an inhibition of non-adult-like responses. The functional 
equivalence with adult readings occurs because the Restrictor Rule puts no 
falsifying case into the restricted domain of quantification when S denotes a 
set of single-participant events. Such events have no discrete subevents; they 
are atomic. 
(13) ~~ 
<• R(e) 3;~-;-S 
dog(x) /~ 
x is dancing( e) 
[R] =fe 13e' [!lELEVANT(e') & dog'"' dancing'(e') & (ese'j] & MAX(e~ 
As for the inhibition effect observed with the incorporation condition, 
this may be explained in terms of an abandonment of quantification over 
events in the face of a need for a more generic, individual-level reading of the 
predicate. Following Kratzer ( 1989), for instance, we may suppose that by 
their very nature individual-level predicates lack implicit event variables. In 
this case. insofar as the child is sensitive to the generic quality of the 
predicate under the incorporated condition, she or he will be unable to 
quantify over events. The Restrictor Rule will simply never get a chance to 
apply because event quantification is abandoned all together in favor of adult-
like quantification over objects. 
This explanation of the phenomenon observed under incorporated 
condition also sheds some light on how the child is able to outgrow the 
symmetrical interpretation and eventually attain the adult grammar in which 
quantification over objects is obligatory for determiner quantifiers like every. 
There is no need to 'un-learn' anything. The child simply shifts from 
quantification over events to quantification over objects. In this case the 
Restrictor Rule stands idle. Without quantification over events there is no 
way for the rule to apply so as to produce the symmetrical interpretation. 
It should also be noted that there is an earlier stage, just after the 
basic quantificational force of every has been acquired, during which the child 
quantifies over events but does not appear to have the Restrictor Rule. 
Instead, the domain of the quantifier is restricted purely in terms of what is 
taken to be the contextually relevant set, i.e. the set of all objects shown in 
the picture. A key indication of this earlier stage is rejection of the picture 
under the transitive condition with reference to the extra. unmentioned agent 
as justification for this response (e.g. because of the mom in (1.a)). 8 
Predictions 
Having accounted for the basic facts of symmetrical interpretation, we 
may now see how the analysis also offers an explanation of why children at 
this age have such a strong, non-adult-like insistence on the distributive/wide 
scope reading of universal quantifiers. especially in the case of every and each. 
In addition. we finally find an explanation of a small but recalcitrant fact, first 
observed by Takahashi (] 991 ), namely the fact that the phenomenon appears 
to be turned off under control condition 3, as exemplified in (:J..d). 
Evidence of children's strong preference for a distributive reading of 
universal quantification is found in their rejection of (llf-.a) and (l't.b) as 
pictures satisfying the truth conditions of sentences The birds are all nding a 
turtle and Even· bird is riding a turtle (Drozd and Philip. 1992). For pictures 
such as ( L'f.a) negative responses were elicited 69%, of the timr for a group 
of 36 children. For ( l 't.b) it was 80o/c of the time with 10 children. In all 
cases children gave th~ characteristic symmetrical interpretation response ( e.g. 
No, because there's no bird on that turtle, that turtle or that turtle). This is just 
as predicted, 
b.cumulative 
Turning to the case of control condition 3, the adult-like response in 
this case was unexpected and somewhat problematic, not only for the Sum of 
~ In addition. the younger child fails control 2 excmplifii:d in (1.b), rderring to the 
monkey holding the balloon as the reason for saying no. This earlier restriction of 1he 
domain of quantification purely in !erms of contextual relcvam-c seems non-linguistic. 
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Plurals account but also for earlier versions of the Restrictor Rule ( cf. Philip. 
1991a and b). But now this response is predicted since the event of the boy 
holding an apple in (1.a) will not be put into the restricted domain of 
quantification by the new Restrictor Rule. It is not a subevent of a real or 
potential event of the type denoted by the nuclear scope; an event of a boy 
eating an apple is not be a subevent of a pig eating an apple. Therefore, 
there is no falsifying case and just as with the intransitive condition the child's 
logical representation turns out to be functionally equivalent to that of the 
adult, event though the child is quantifying over events. 
Conclusion 
We have seen that a series of recalcitrant facts about children's use of 
universal quantifiers can receive a unified and principled explanation under 
the proposed analysis. Tbe principal claims are: (i) that children 
overgeneralize quantification over events or situations, applying it even to 
determiner quantifiers: (ii) that they lack a compositional means (e.g. QR) of 
deriving a restriction for the domain of the universal quantifier, and instead 
make use of a pragmatic mechanism; and (iii) that as a consequence of their 
non-adult-like treatment of universal quantifiers, children manifest a 
preference for distributive readings. As regards the notion of a primitive, 
'anti-compositional' form of QR, there may be some independent evidence for 
this hypothesis in the way children at this age handle the quantifier only 
(Crain, Philip, Drozd, Roeper and Matsuoka (in progress)). It seems that 
children give a single interpretation to a sentence containing on~v regardless 
of its syntactic positicn. For example, with respect (IS'), all three of the 
sentences on the right ••re found false of the picture for the same reason, i.e. 
because a boy has a balloon too. It is as if the children were always fronting 
only to a sentence-adverbial position prior to interpreting it.9 
(IS') 
Only the girl has a red balloon 
The girl only has a red balloon 
The girl has only a red balloon 
9 And interpreted it as 'living on' the subject NP 
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Whether or not the children's linguistic behavior is evidence that in the 
absence of QR they are nonetheless fronting quantifiers to A-bar positions, 
by means of a kind of incipient QR, it seems clear that their denvation of 
logical form is semantically driven. Extracting a quantifier from a sentence 
satisfies an interpretive need; it serves a semantic function. It is not the side 
effect of some gradually maturing innate compulsion to restructure linguistic 
representations. 10 Similarly, the need to find a restriction for the domain 
of quantification is also an interpretive need. In the absence of QR some 
other mechanism is seen to arise in order to satisfy this need. In this sense 
the Restrictor Rule looks like a fom1 of accommodation. The child knows 
that universal quantifier calls for some sort of restriction to the domain of 
quantification; the problem is how to 'accommodate' this need. 11 
Alternatively, viewed from phylogenetic perspective, we might wonder if QR 
itself were not the grammaticization of a rule of accommodation. In any case, 
it is interesting to note that the Restrictor Rule conforms to Subset Principle. 
albeit in a purely semantic domain. 
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